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How degree distribution broadness influences network robustness: comparing
localized and random attacks
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The stability of networks is greatly influenced by their degree distributions and in particular by
their broadness. Networks with broader degree distributions are usually more robust to random
failures but less robust to localized attacks. To better understand the effect of the broadness of the
degree distribution we study two models in which the broadness is controlled and compare their
robustness against localized attacks (LA) and random attacks (RA). We study analytically and by
numerical simulations the cases where the degrees in the networks follow a bi-Poisson distribution
P (k) = αe−λ1
λk
1
k!
+ (1− α)e−λ2
λk
2
k!
, α ∈ [0, 1], and a Gaussian distribution P (k) = A · exp(− (k−µ)
2
2σ2
)
with a normalization constant A where k ≥ 0. In the bi-Poisson distribution the broadness is
controlled by the values of α, λ1, and λ2, while in the Gaussian distribution it is controlled by the
standard deviation, σ. We find that only when α = 0 or α = 1, i.e., degrees obeying a pure Poisson
distribution, are LA and RA the same. In all other cases networks are more vulnerable under LA
than under RA. For a Gaussian distribution with an average degree µ fixed, we find that when σ2 is
smaller than µ the network is more vulnerable against random attack. However, when σ2 is larger
than µ the network becomes more vulnerable against localized attack. Similar qualitative results
are also shown for interdependent networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Complex networks are widely used as models to un-
derstand such features of complex systems as structure,
stability, and function [1–20]. The robustness of networks
suffering site or link attacks is a topic of great interest
because it is an important issue affecting many real-world
networks. Such approaches as site percolation on a net-
work where nodes suffer either random attack (RA) [2–
4] or targeted attack (TA) based on node connectivity
[2, 3] have been developed to study these phenomena.
Localized attack (LA) in which nodes surrounding a seed
node are removed layer by layer has also been recently in-
troduced [21, 22]. In addition, interdependent networks
are more vulnerable to RA and TA than isolated sin-
gle networks [23–29]. LA on spatially embedded interde-
pendent networks has been addressed, and a significant
metastable regime where LA above a critical size propa-
gates throughout the whole system has also been found
[22].
Although prior research has developed tools for prob-
ing network robustness against all these attack scenar-
ios and has found that degree distribution broadness
strongly influences network stability [5], there has been
no systematic study of how degree distribution broad-
ness affects robustness. Here we compare LA and RA on
two networks models in which the broadness is controlled.
One model is bi-Poisson with two groups having different
average degrees. The difference between the two average
degrees characterizes the broadness of the degree distri-
bution of the network. Although research on this topic
usually focuses on a network with a pure Poisson degree
distribution, many real-world networks have two or more
degree distributions [30, 31]. For example, a network of
two groups of people, a high-degree group with many
friends and a low-degree group with few friends, might
reflect a bi-Poisson distribution. Note that bi-Piossonian
networks are optimally robust against TA [30]. The sec-
ond model in which the broadness can be controlled is a
Gaussian degree distribution. Here the standard devia-
tion σ characterizes the broadness of the degree distribu-
tion. This distribution is realistic, e.g., the distribution
of WWW links resembles a Gaussian distribution [32].
We here analyze the robustness against attack of net-
works in which we can tune the broadness of the degree
distributions, e.g., those with bi-Poisson and Gaussian
degree distributions. We limit our approach to LA and
RA and use the frameworks developed in Refs. [4] and
[21], extending them to study (i) single networks with a
bi-Poisson distribution, (ii) single networks with a Gaus-
sian distribution, (iii) fully interdependent networks with
the same bi-Poisson distribution in each network, and
(iv) fully interdependent networks with the same Gaus-
sian distribution in each network. By changing α of the
bi-Poisson distribution
P (k) = αe−λ1
λk1
k!
+ (1 − α)e−λ2
λk2
k!
, α ∈ [0, 1], (1)
with fixed λ1 and λ2, and σ
2 of the Gaussian distribution,
P (k) = A · exp(−
(k − µ)2
2σ2
), k ≥ 0, (2)
with µ fixed, we investigate how the distribution broad-
ness influences the percolation properties. These include
the size of the giant component P∞ as a function p, the
fraction of unremoved nodes and the critical threshold pc
at which the giant component P∞ first collapses. In all
cases we find that our extensive simulations and analyt-
ical calculations are in agreement, and observe the qual-
itative characteristics of robustness in both single and
interdependent networks under both LA and RA.
2II. RA AND LA ON A SINGLE NETWORK
A. Theory
Following Ref. [33], we introduce the generating func-
tion of the degree distribution P (k) of a certain network
as
G0(x) =
∑
k
P (k)xk. (3)
Similarly, for the generating function of the underlying
branching processes, we have
G1(x) =
∑
k
P (k)k
〈k〉
xk−1 =
G
′
0(x)
G
′
0(1)
. (4)
The size distribution of the clusters that can be reached
from a randomly chosen link is generated in a self-
consistent equation
H1(x) = xG1(H1(x)). (5)
Then the size distribution of the clusters that can be
traversed by randomly following a starting vertex is gen-
erated by
H0(x) = xG0(H1(x)). (6)
Next we distinguish between random attack and localized
attack.
(I) Random Attack: An initial attack with the ran-
dom removal of a fraction 1 − p of nodes from the net-
work changes the cluster size distribution of the remain-
ing network and the generating functions of the surviving
clusters’ size distribution become [4]
H1(x) = 1− p+ pxG1(H1(x)), (7)
and analogously,
H0(x) = 1− p+ pxG0(H1(x)). (8)
Here pc, the critical value at which the giant component
collapses, is determined by
pc =
1
G
′
1(1)
, (9)
and
pc =
1
G
′
1(1)
=
G
′
0(1)
G
′′
0 (1)
, (10)
which is equivalent to the expression pc = 〈k〉/〈k(k − 1)〉
given in Ref. [3].
Thus for a bi-Poisson distribution, because G0(x) =
αeλ1(x−1) + (1− α)eλ2(x−1), pc is
pc =
αλ1 + (1− α)λ2
αλ21 + (1− α)λ
2
2
. (11)
For a Gaussian distribution we have
pc =
∑
∞
1 ke
(−(k−µ)2/2σ2)
∑
∞
2 k(k − 1)e
(−(k−µ)2/2σ2)
. (12)
The size of the resultant giant component is [4]
P∞(p) = 1−H0(1) = p[1−G0(H1(1))], (13)
which can be numerically determined by solving H1(1)
from its self-consistent equation
H1(1) = 1− p+ pG1(H1(1)). (14)
(II) Localized Attack : We next consider the local re-
moval of a fraction 1 − p of nodes, starting with a ran-
domly chosen seed node. Here we remove the seed node
and its nearest neighbors, next-nearest neighbors, next-
next-nearest neighbors, and continue until a fraction 1−p
of nodes have been removed from the network. This
pattern of attack reflects such real-world cases as earth-
quakes or the use of weapons of mass destruction. As
in Ref. [21], the localized attack occurs in two stages, (i)
nodes belonging to the attacked area (the seed node and
the layers surrounding it) are removed but the links con-
necting them to the remaining nodes of the network are
left in place, but then (ii) these links are also removed.
Following the method introduced in Refs. [21, 34], we find
the generating function of the degree distribution of the
remaining network to be
Gp0(x) =
1
G0(f)
G0[f +
G
′
0(f)
G
′
0(1)
(x− 1)], (15)
where f ≡ G−10 (p). The generating function of the un-
derlying branching process is thus
Gp1(x) =
G
′
p0(x)
G
′
p0(1)
. (16)
The generating function of the cluster size distribution
following a random starting node in the remaining net-
work is
Hp0(x) = xGp0(Hp1(x)), (17)
where Hp1(x), the generating function of the cluster size
distribution given by randomly traversing a link, satisfies
the self-consistent condition
Hp1(x) = xGp1(Hp1(x)). (18)
The network begins to generate a giant component when
G
′
p1(1) = 1 [21], which yields pc as the solution to
G
′′
0 (G
−1
0 (pc)) = G
′
0(1). (19)
The size of the giant component P∞(p) as a fraction of
the remaining network thus satisfies [21]
P∞(p) = p [1−Gp0(Hp1(1))] , (20)
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Sizes of giant component, P∞(p), as
a function of p for λ1 = 4, λ2 = 12 and α = 0.7. Here
solid lines are theoretical predictions, from Eq. (13) for RA
(red line) and Eq. (20) for LA (green line), and symbols are
simulation results with network size N = 104, where averages
are taken over 10 realizations, under LA (©) and RA ().
which can be numerically determined by first solving
Hp1(1) from Eq. (18), i.e., Hp1(1) = Gp1(Hp1(1)).
In order to determine pc explicitly, we first get fc from
fc ≡ G
−1
0 (pc), i.e., fc from G0(fc) = pc. Then from
Eq. (19) fc must also satisfy G
′′
0 (fc) = G
′
0(1). In the
general case, pc and P∞ must be obtained by solving
numerically Eqs. (19) and (20). In certain limiting cases,
however, one can derive explicit analytical expressions
for pc that yield more physical insight. An example of a
specific case is given in the next subsection.
1. Analytic solution of pc for bi-Poisson distribution with
λ2 = 2λ1
For a bi-Poisson distribution, using its generating func-
tion and G0(fc) = pc, fc and pc satisfy the relation
G0(fc) = α[e
(fc−1)]λ1 + (1− α)[e(fc−1)]λ2 = pc. (21)
Assuming λ2 = 2λ1, we denote e
λ1(fc−1) = y such that
Eq. (21) reduces to αy+(1−α)y2 = pc, which, for α 6= 1,
is a quadratic equation of y and its positive solution is
y =
√
α2 + 4pc(1− α)− α
2(1− α)
. (22)
Plugging fc into Eq. (19) we get another quadratic equa-
tion of y,
αλ21y + (1− α)λ
2
2y
2 = αλ1 + (1− α)λ2, (23)
for which the physical solution of y is
y =
√
α2λ41 + 4(1− α)λ
2
2[α(λ1 − λ2) + λ2]− αλ
2
1
2(1− α)λ22
. (24)
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Percolation thresholds pc of a single
bi-Poisson network as a function of α under LA and RA with
λ1 = 4, λ2 = 12. Here solid lines are theoretical predictions,
from Eq. (11) for RA (blue line) and Eq. (19) for LA (green
line) and symbols ( for RA and © for LA) with error bars
are simulation results with network size of N = 104 nodes,
where averages and standard deviations are taken over 20
realizations.
Because fc = ln(y)/λ1+1, to obtain pc we need to equate
Eqs. (22) and (24). Thus we obtain
pc =
1
64(1− α)
[β + 6α
√
α2 + β − 6α2], (25)
where β = 16(1−α)(2−α)λ1 . We use the relation of λ2 = 2λ1
for simplification. Plugging α = 0 into Eq. (25), we get
pc = 1/λ2 as found in Ref. [21]. For α → 1, employing
the L’Hoˆpital rule we also get limα→1 pc = 1/λ1, as found
in the pure Poisson distribution described above.
It is impossible to derive pc explicitly for a Gaussian
distribution. Even for a bi-Poisson distribution, other
than special cases such as the one discussed above, de-
riving pc is also impossible because it requires solving
first fc = G
−1
0 (pc), i.e., fc from Eq. (21), which could be
viewed as αyλ1 +(1−α)yλ2 = pc, a polynomial equation
of y = e(fc−1). Because we also consider the cases of
λ2 > λ1 > 4 using the Abel-Ruffini theorem, there is no
general algebraic solution to the above equation except
in some special cases. Hence we use the Newton method
to solve pc and P∞ numerically.
B. Results
To test the analytical predictions above we conduct nu-
merical calculations of analytic expressions, and compare
the results with the simulation results on single networks
with degrees following both bi-Poisson distributions and
Gaussian distributions under both LA and RA. All the
simulation results are obtained for networks of N = 104
nodes.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Comparison between numerical results
(symbols) and the analytic results (solid lines) for bi-Poisson
distribution with λ1 = 4 and λ2 = 8. Note that they agree
with each other well. Here, all the analytic results are ob-
tained from Eq. (11) for RA (red line) and Eq. (25) for LA
(black line) and the numerical results are attained by employ-
ing Newton’s Method on Eqs. (11) and (19) respectively.
1. Single bi-Poisson networks
Figure 1 shows the giant component P∞(p) as a func-
tion of the occupation probability p under LA and RA.
Note that pc is larger for LA than for RA. The simu-
lation results agree with the theoretical results obtained
from Eqs. (13) and (20), and there is second-order perco-
lation transition behavior in both attack scenarios. Note
that when α = 0 or 1, i.e., when node degrees follow
a pure Poisson distribution as reported in Ref. [21], the
networks have the same critical value of pc under LA and
RA and the same dependence of P∞(p) on p. However
when α = 0.7, pc(LA) > pc(RA), indicating that the net-
work is more fragile under LA than under RA, and that
the giant components exhibit different behavior.
Figure 2 shows how the broadness of the distribution,
tuned by changing α with fixed λ1 and λ2, influences the
robustness of the network under LA and RA. The solid
lines are the numerical results obtained from the Newton
method and the symbols with error bars are the simula-
tion results. Note that only when α = 0 and α = 1 does
pc(LA) = pc(RA). In all other cases pc(LA) > pc(RA),
indicating that the network is always more vulnerable
under LA than under RA if the degree distribution is
bi-Poissonian. Note also that pc(LA) peaks at α = 0.79.
For the special case of λ2 = 2λ1, we compare the
analytical values of pc from Eqs. (11) and (25) using
λ1 = 4 and λ2 = 8 with results obtained from the New-
ton method (see Fig. 3). For this combination of average
degrees, pc(LA) peaks at α = 0.91. Note that the results
agree, indicating that the Newton method produces satis-
factory results and therefore, in the general case in which
λ2 6= 2λ1 and in the cases of Gaussian distribution, it can
be used to get pc(LA).
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Sizes of giant component as a function
of p of a single Gaussian network with µ = 4 and σ2 = 2.
Here solid lines are theoretical results, from Eq. (13) for RA
(blue line) and Eq. (20) for LA (green line) and symbols are
simulation results obtained from network size of N = 104
where averages are taken over 10 realizations under LA (©)
and RA ().
2. Single Gaussian Networks
Figure 4 shows the giant component P∞(p) as a func-
tion of the occupation probability p under LA and RA
respectively for a single network with a Gaussian de-
gree distribution. Note that the simulation results and
the theoretical results obtained from Eqs. (13) and (20)
agree, and that second-order phase transition behavior is
present in both attack scenarios. Note also that µ = 4
and σ2 = 2, and thus pc(LA) < pc(RA), which indicates
that the network is more robust under LA than under
RA for this particular distribution.
We fix µ and find that when the Gaussian distribution
gets broader, i.e., when σ increases, pc(RA) decreases,
but that pc(LA) increases with σ (see Fig. 5). Note that
when σ2 < µ, pc(LA) < pc(RA), and that the opposite
is true when σ2 > µ. Note also that when σ2 ≈ µ there
is a crossing point with pc(RA) ≈ pc(LA), which is anal-
ogous to a Poisson ER network with the same mean and
variance and the robustness of the network under both
LA and RA is the same, as reported in Ref. [21].
Figure 6 shows a plot of σ2 as a function of µ when this
intersection point occurs, i.e., when pc(LA) = pc(RA).
Note that except for some minor deviations at small µ
values, because k ≥ 0 the Gaussian distribution is de-
formed, the region above the extrapolation curve corre-
sponds to pc(LA) > pc(RA), and the region below to
pc(LA) < pc(RA).
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Percolation thresholds pc as a function
of σ2 of networks with Gaussian degree distribution under LA
and RA with µ = 4. Here solid lines are theoretical predic-
tions, from Eq. (12) for RA (red line) and Eq. (19) for LA
(black line) and symbols ( for RA and © for LA) with er-
ror bars are simulation results with network size of N = 104
nodes, where averages and standard deviations are taken over
20 realizations. It is shown here that as σ2 increases pc(LA)
increases whereas pc(RA) decreases simultaneously and they
intersect each other around σ2 ≈ µ = 4.
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FIG. 6. (Color online) σ2 as a function of µ at the intersec-
tion point where pc(LA) = pc(RA) for single networks where
degrees follow a Gaussian distribution.
III. RA AND LA ON FULLY
INTERDEPENDENT NETWORKS
A. Theory
We apply the formalism of RA on fully interdependent
networks introduced in Ref. [23]. Specifically, we consider
two networksA and B with the same number of nodes N .
Within each network the nodes are randomly connected
with degree distributions PA(k) and PB(k) respectively.
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FIG. 7. (Color online) Sizes of the mutually connected giant
component of the fully interdependent bi-Poisson networks
as a function of p for λ1 = 4, λ2 = 12 and α = 0.5. Here
solid lines are theoretical predictions, from Eq. (26) for RA
(blue line) and similarly for LA (green line), and symbols are
simulation results with network size N = 104, where averages
are taken over 10 realizations, under LA (©) and RA ().
Every node in network A depends on a random node in
network B, and vice versa. We also assume that if a
node i in network A depends on a node j in network B
and node j depends on node l in network A, then l = i,
which rules out the feedback condition [35]. This full
interdependency means that every node i in network A
has a dependent node j in network B, and if node i fails
node j will also fail, and vice versa.
(I) Random Attack : We begin by randomly removing
a fraction 1 − p of nodes and their links in network A.
All the nodes in network B that are dependent on the re-
moved nodes in network A are also removed along with
their connectivity links. As nodes and links are sequen-
tially removed, each network begin to break down into
connected components. Due to interdependency, the re-
moval process iterates back and forth between the two
networks until they fragment completely or produce a
mutually connected giant component with no further dis-
integration. As in Ref. [23] we introduce the function
gA(p) = 1 −GA0[1 − p(1 − fA)], which is the fraction of
nodes that belong to the giant component of network A,
where fA is a function of p that satisfies the transcenden-
tal equation fA = GA1[1− p(1− fA)]. Similar equations
exist for network B. When the system of interdependent
networks stops disintegrating, the fraction of nodes in the
mutual giant component is P∞, satisfying
P∞ = xgB(x) = ygA(y), (26)
where x and y satisfy
x = pgA(y), y = pgB(x). (27)
Excluding the trivial solution x = 0, y = 0 to the equa-
tion set above, we combine them into a single equation
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FIG. 8. (Color online) Percolation thresholds pc of the fully
interdependent bi-Poisson networks with λ1 = 4, λ2 = 12
as a function of α under LA and RA. Here solid lines are
theoretical predictions, from Eq. (29) for RA (blue line) and
similarly for LA (green line) and symbols ( for RA and© for
LA) with error bars are simulation results with network size
of N = 104 nodes, where averages and standard deviations
are taken from 20 realizations. When α is not 1 or 0, pc(LA)
is always larger than pc(RA).
by substitution and obtain,
x = gA[gB(x)p]p. (28)
A nontrivial solution emerges in the critical case (x =
xc, p = pc) by equating the derivatives of both sides of
Eq. (28) with respect to x
1 = p2
dgA[pgB(x)]
dx
dgB(x)
dx
x=xc,p=pc (29)
which, together with Eq. (27), gives the solution for pc
and the critical size of the mutually connected compo-
nent, P∞(pc) = xcgB(xc).
(II) Localized Attack : When LA is performed on the
one-to-one fully interdependent networks A and B de-
scribed above, we can find an equivalent random net-
work E with generating function GE0(x) such that after
a random attack in which 1−p nodes in network E are re-
moved, the generating function of the degree distribution
of the remaining network is the same as Gp0(x) (with the
substitution of G0(x) by GA0(x)). Then the LA problem
on networks A and B can be mapped to a RA problem on
networks E and B. By using GE0(1− p+ px) = Gp0(x)
and from Eq. (15) we have
GE0(x) =
1
GA0(f)
GA0[f +
G
′
A0(f)
G
′
A0(1)GA0(f)
(x− 1)]. (30)
Thus by mapping the LA problem on interdependent
networksA and B to a RA problem on a transformed pair
of interdependent networks E and B, we can apply the
mechanism of RA on interdependent networks to solve pc
and P∞(p) under LA.
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FIG. 9. (Color online) Sizes of mutual giant component of the
fully interdependent Gaussian networks as a function of p with
µ = 4 and σ2 = 2. Here solid lines are theoretical predictions,
from Eq. (26) for RA (red line)and similarly for LA (black
line), and symbols are simulation results with network size
N = 104, where averages are taken over 10 realizations, under
LA (©) and RA ().
Note that for pure Poisson distributions, f ≡
G−1A0(p) =
ln(p)
λ + 1, and that by substituting f into
Eq. (30) we get GE0(x) = GA0(x). Thus we find that
pure Poisson distributions have exactly the same perco-
lation properties for fully interdependent networks under
LA as those under RA, as found in Ref. [23]. Because
the extreme complexity of the above equations makes it
difficult to obtain explicit expressions for pc and P∞(p)
except when degree distributions are simple, we resort to
numerical calculations in general.
B. Results
1. Fully interdependent networks with bi-Poisson degree
distribution
We start with two fully interdependent networks in
which the degrees both follow the same bi-Poisson distri-
bution and carry out a RA on one of the networks, initi-
ating a cascading failure process that will continue until
equilibrium is reached. We then do the same procedure
with the same set-up but this time using a LA to initiate
the cascading failure process. Figure 7 shows the size of
the giant component P∞(p) of the system as a function
of the occupation probability p under LA and under RA.
Note that in both RA and LA scenarios the simulation re-
sults and the theoretical results obtained from Eq. (26)
agree, indicating that our strategy of finding an equiv-
alent network under LA works. The first-order phase
transition that occurs in both attack scenarios indicates
that the interdependency of the system makes it much
more vulnerable to attack than single networks. When
α = 0.5 the system is more fragile under LA than under
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FIG. 10. (Color online) Percolation thresholds pc as a func-
tion of σ2 of the fully interdependent Gaussian networks un-
der LA and RA with µ = 4. Here solid lines are theoretical
predictions, from Eq. (29) for RA (red line) and similarly
for LA (black line) and symbols ( for RA and © for LA)
with error bars are simulation results with network size of
N = 104 nodes, where averages and standard deviations are
taken from 20 realizations. It is seen here that as σ2 increases
pc(LA) increases and pc(RA) has a tendency to decrease. As
σ2 approaches the value of µ, pc(LA) ≈ pc(RA), which is
manifested by the intersection point shown here.
RA with pc(LA) > pc(RA), and the giant components
exhibit different behaviors.
Figure 8 shows how the broadness of the distribu-
tion, tuned by changing α with fixed λ1 and λ2, influ-
ences the robustness of the network under both LA and
RA. Solid lines are numerical results using the Newton
method on Eq. (29) and symbols with error bars are
simulation results. Note that only when α = 0 and
α = 1 is P (k) reduced to a pure Poisson, and we have
pc(LA) = pc(RA) = 2.4554/ 〈k〉, as in Ref. [23]. When
α deviates from 0 or 1, i.e., when P (k) deviates from
a pure Poisson distribution and takes the form of a bi-
Poisson distribution, pc(LA) > pc(RA), indicating that
the system is more vulnerable under LA than under RA.
2. Fully interdependent networks with Gaussian degree
distribution
We construct two fully interdependent networks in
which the degrees in each network follow the same Gaus-
sian distribution and carry out a RA on one of the net-
works to initiate a cascading failure process that will con-
tinue until it reaches a steady state. We repeat the ac-
tion, but this time using a LA. Figure 9 shows the sizes
of the giant component P∞(p) as a function of the occu-
pation probability p under both LA and RA. Note that
simulation results and the theoretical results obtained
from Eq. (26) agree. When µ = 4 and σ2 = 2 the
system is more fragile under LA than under RA with
pc(LA) < pc(RA), and the giant components exhibit dif-
ferent behaviors.
If we fix µ, when the Gaussian distribution gets
broader, i.e., when σ increases, analogous to what we
find in a single Gaussian network, the critical pc be-
havior of the system differs under LA from that un-
der RA. Figure 10 shows the effect of σ on pc in the
fully interdependent Gaussian networks. When σ2 < µ,
pc(LA) < pc(RA), and the opposite occurs when σ
2 > µ.
The intersection point in Fig. 10 is located near σ2 ≈ µ,
similar to that in Poisson distribution networks. Thus
the system behaves the same under LA as under RA, con-
firming the results presented in the previous subsection.
Note that our results show that in both attack scenarios,
the interdependency of the system makes it much more
vulnerable to RA and LA compared to single networks
(compare Fig. 10 to Fig. 5).
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we show that a LA on interdependent net-
works can be mapped to a RA problem by transforming
the network under initial attack. We also show how the
broadness of the degree distribution affects the robust-
ness of networks against RA and LA respectively. We
show that, in general, as the degree distribution broad-
ens the network becomes more vulnerable to LA than
RA. This finding holds for both single networks and in-
terdependent networks.
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